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1. Introduction chapter
1.1 Motivation
Our motivation for doing this study sprung from a conversation about the fate of 
communist states, and how, while communism in its roots is concerned with solidarity 
and equality, they tend to always turn into dictatorships. We talked about relevant 
examples such as Stalin in the USSR, Mao in China and even Fidel in Cuba. We ended 
up talking about Kim Jong-Il in North Korea, as he has gone to extremes to control his 
country with his father’s idea of Juche. While one can argue that there are still 
communist-inspired dictatorships out there (Fidel before in Cuba, now Raúl) North 
Korea remains the most obvious and extreme case, and as such is largely the motivation 
for doing a study on the degeneration of communist rules in the context of ideology, 
democracy and political legitimacy. We see North Korea’s current political situation as 
a problem, due to the fact that we have grown up in a country and part of the world 
where a lot of emphasis is put on free speech, democracy and in general the overall 
thought of personal freedom – something we do not see in North Korea. We also believe 
it to be a problem if a country utilises an ideology as a justification for rule, when that 
ideology by no means represents the reality of the rule.
1.2 Problem Area
In the late 1940s two separate states were created on the Korean Peninsula. The 
southern part of the peninsula was named the Republic of Korea, or in modern-day 
language simply South Korea. It is a country based on western capitalist and democratic 
ideals. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or North Korea is based on the 
ideals of communist ideologies. As such the Korean Peninsula could be seen as a 
reflection of the contemporary political situation of the late 1940’s. But as history tells 
us, communism took a fall with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, but the 
supposedly North Korean communist-inspired rule never ended, and to this day still 
exists. However even a cursory look at the country will readily show that despite its 
constitutional claims, it is neither democratic nor is it the people's. It follows Kim Il-
Sung's own political and social philosophy called “Juche”. This philosophy is in three 
parts, and the purpose is to ensure political, economic and military self reliance of the 
country. Despite this philosophy, the country is plagued with famine and power outages. 
As stated in our problem formulation, we wish to figure out how the current regime of 
North Korea, based on the ideas of the Kim dynasty, has created its power, as well as 
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how it maintains this power. We also wish to ask how it is possible for the North 
Korean population to remain loyal to the rule of their leader Kim Jong-Il, or, at the very 
least, how it is possible to remain passive.
In order to determine how and why this is, we are going to look at the history of the 
Korean Peninsula. We will also research several communist ideologies in order to 
determine what Juche is, and if it is feasible to have derived from these communist 
ideologies.
More specifically, we will look at the North Korean way of approaching communism by 
analysing Juche and investigate how communist ideology has been altered into the 
contemporary ideology of the North Korea.
We intend to research communist ideologies in general, in order to get a broader 
understanding of communism. We will be examine Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism and 
Maoism for this purpose, and through this research we hope to gain insight an insight of 
better understanding of the Juche ideology. In order to analyse North Korea and Juche, 
we will also need a more historically oriented perspective, and as such will go through 
some of the crucial elements of North Korea’s history, ancient as well as recent. This 
will allow us to use both ideology and history as indicators in our analysis on how an 
allegedly communist-inspired state has turned into the reality of 'Juche'.
In order to provide an answer as to why the people of North Korea allow the rule of 
Kim Jong-Il, we are going to use Max Weber’s thoughts on legitimacy, and apply those 
to the rule of North Korea, in order to analyse legitimacy. We are also going to apply 
the theory of banal nationalism in order to get a better view of the symbols that are 
utilised in order to maintain loyalty and patriotism.
Following this, we will attempt to figure out whether or not the population of North 
Korea can be called politically and socially free, when taken in the context of 
constitutional rights, indoctrination and media.
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1.3 Project design
In the project, we have decided to split the text into five main chapters and an 
introductory chapter. The introduction will contain our motivation for doing this project,  
our problem area and the project design. The last part of the introduction chapter will 
feature our problem formulation, hypothesis, working questions as well as our key 
assumptions.
 
After the introduction chapter, our methodology chapter will outline the methodological 
background of our research, as well as our chosen ontology, which is constructionism, 
as well as our epistemology, interpretivism. It contains descriptions on how our work 
procedure will be carried out. The chapter will also include a description on how we 
have carried out our data collection, and which problems we have encountered in the 
process.
Following, we have our theory chapter, which contains the different theories, we are go-
ing to apply to our empirical data. The first question and assumption will feature extens-
ive use of Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, Maoist and Juche theory. For our second working 
question and key assumption we will apply the ideal types of legitimacy as well as 
banal nationalism. The third and last working question will be building on the above-
mentioned theories as well as introduce some theoretical concepts of censorship and 
freedom.
After the theoretical chapter, our empirical material will be introduced in the contextu-
alisation chapter. Here we will touch upon the historical background of North Korea, 
and end with a comparative description of Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism and 
Juche.
When we have outlined our theories and empirical material, we can truly begin our ana-
lysis. This is done in the analysis chapter, which is split into three parts, one for each of 
our working questions and key assumptions. Each question will be analysed separately, 
using Marxist theories, legitimacy, banal nationalism and concepts of censorship and 
freedom by Karl Marx and John Locke as mentioned in the theory chapter.
When the contextualisation and analysis is done, we will bring everything together. This 
is done in the 'discussion and conclusion’ chapter. This is where we will combine the in-
dividual analyses of the working questions; thus we will spark a discussion that will 
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then end in our conclusion. We will also use both discussion and conclusion in order to 
put our work in perspective.
Finally, we will end our project report with a chapter on afterthoughts, and then our lit-
erature list and appendices.
1.4 Problem formulation:
How has the ideology of 'Juche', and the Kim family created and maintained their rule  
of North Korea?
- We hypothesise that the Kim family rules the country through an excessive use of 
propaganda, an extensive military and cult-like personal worship.
1.5 Working questions: 
1. What are the main characteristics and differences between the various forms of  
communist inspired ideology, and how does juche compare?
(By various forms of communist ideologies, we specifically mean Marxism, Leninism, 
Stalinism and Maoism)
Assumption: Juche’s status as a state philosophy has succeeded in keeping one single 
family in power for more than 60 years, creating an autocracy.
2. From a Weberian point of view on legitimate rule, and through Billig’s theory of  
banal nationalism, what measures are taken by the regime to ensure loyalty and  
patriotism from the people of North Korea?
Assumption:  The fact that North Korea has been a warring nation for more than 60 
years has helped the Kim dynasty stay in power.
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3. Can the population of North Korea be considered politically and socially free?
Assumption: The people of North Korea are held in complete isolation from the rest of 
the world: deprived of citizenship and social rights – the two terms will be defined in 
the following chapter.
1.6 Concepts & Definitions:
In this chapter, we present our definitions of the following concepts:
Citizenship: The constitutional contract between a people and their state.
Indoctrination: Teaching a group to accept beliefs without criticism
Kimilsungism: Description of the ideology of Kim Il-Sung which covers the state con-
struction and socialist revolution of North Korea. Basically it is another word for Juche.
North Korea: While the official name of North Korea is actually The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), for the sake general convenience and understand-
ing, we have decided to call it North Korea in our project, at least when not used in a 
formal context.
Propaganda: Biased or misleading information used in order to promote a political 
cause or point of view.
Social and political rights: The constitutional rights that are afforded the people of a 
country.
8
2. Methodology
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we are going to outline the methodological background of the project. 
First we will explain our use of ontology and epistemology. Then we will write about 
our method, why we are approaching our data deductively. We will also talk about how 
we are doing our data collection and touch upon the validity of the material, and lastly,  
we will discuss the strengths and limitations of the different approaches. Finally, we 
will also describe why this is a case study.
2.2 Ontology
Ontology is described as how we view and how we accept that our reality can be 
explained (Olsen & Pedersen 2008: 150). Our world view is that social phenomena of 
all kinds are in a constant state of flux, that they are dynamic as opposed to static 
(Bryman 2008: 19). As such social phenomena are subject to change, both localised 
change, but they may also change other social phenomena. Another point is that we do 
not believe in pure objectivity. We accept that we, as researchers and as part of this 
dynamic world, are no more immune to manipulation than the social phenomenon 
around us. As such, we do not believe that there is such a thing as pure objectivism or 
definitive truth (Bryman 2008: 19). Based on this view, our ontological approach is 
constructionism.
2.3 Epistemology
Epistemology determines how we see knowledge, and what we accept as actual 
knowledge. (Bryman 2008: 19) Due to our research material being primarily 
qualitative, and our ontological approach being constructionist, we believe that 
interpretivism is the most suiting option for us. We believe this due to the fact that 
interpretivism aims at understanding through interpretation. Unlike other 
epistemologies from the more natural scientific camp, interpretivism does not require 
definitive objective truth, but makes room for interpretation. Interpretivism also 
emphasises the differences in how the investigated object is seen. (Bryman 2008: 19)
We realise that every choice has consequences, and as such we accept that in the case of 
our choice in ontology and epistemology there are certain delimitations. The most 
potent of these delimitations is in our view of the fact that constructionist ontology does 
not deal with pure objectivism or definitive truths, thus anything we conclude is only a 
truth insofar as our methodological choices allow for truths. 
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2.4 Methods applied
We are doing a deductive study, as we are using established theories in order to answer 
our problem formulation. We also make use of a hypothesis, which is usually part of a 
deductive approach.
Had we taken an inductive approach, we would have started out with extensive data 
collection, and we would attempt to form a theory based on the results of our research.
2.5 Case study
To understand how the Kim regime sustains its political legitimacy, we have chosen to 
make a case study of North Korea, as the regime’s rather unique features continuously 
stand out in the contemporary scene of international politics. A more holistic approach 
seems appropriate in order to establish a full picture of how the system is structured 
around Kim Il-Sung’s Juche – taking into account the historical context of the war-torn 
Korea and the means of spreading and sustaining the Juche ideology (and condemning 
any other). Thus enlightening the stark contrast between the regime’s official policies 
and its corresponding exertion of authority.
2.6 Data collection
Our empirical data consist solely of secondary and tertiary qualitative data. This 
includes academic publications, articles and journals as well as internet based source-
material.
Despite the fact that we only use qualitative material, we oppose the idea of purist-
based methodology. And as such we would have liked to utilise quantitative material, 
had we found it viable in answering our problem formulation.
In the ideology parts, we have been as unbiased as possible. We have purposely used 
political encyclopedias/dictionaries and textbooks for political science as our main 
empirical material for those parts, and not complete works on specific ideologies. This 
is done because a book on e.g. Stalinism could be very biased in its explanations due to 
the author having a special reason for writing the books. In the encyclopedias there is a 
good opportunity that the author is unbiased, as there are several editors, and also an 
advisory panel.
Freedom House is an American-based organisation. It focuses on promoting political, 
social and media freedom in the world. While being based in America, it does have 
several other locations around the world. A point of critique could be the fact that they 
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do receive some of their funding from the United States of America. However, they 
address this issue themselves, saying that the money used to conduct their world 
freedom tests, are solely private donors, and not state sponsorships. As such, they argue 
that their data is not biased. Another point of critique could be the fact that they have 
designed their own questions and measurement systems of political, social and media 
freedom. But can freedom really be measured on a scale? While, in the end one could 
agree that freedom in itself is immeasurable We still believe that the measurement 
template of Freedom House holds merit as solid indicators of the varying levels of 
freedom in countries around the world.
Lastly, as the majority of our sources are of American origin, we do realise that USA 
and North Korea have had an excessive amount of tensions since the founding of North 
Korea, thus one should keep that in mind when considering the validity of the data.
2.7 Delimitations
As we have covered, banal nationalism entails the symbols and events that reproduce 
nationhood, but they do so unnoticed. As such, we have come across a rather unique 
problem. That problem is simply put that it is difficult to figure out where the 
production and reproduction of nationhood, through banal nationalism, starts, and 
indoctrination ends. We put a lot of emphasis on the “unnoticed” part of banal 
nationalism, and we do this due to the theory itself, but even more so because of the 
problems we face when considering indoctrination. The Kim family in North Korea 
makes extensive use of propaganda, and they do so through  different media and in 
many different places, this much we have also covered, and as such we have to ask 
ourselves that when a child is born into a world that is saturated in propaganda, what is 
noticed, what is confronted and what goes unnoticed? Therefore the two are, from our 
limited point of view, intertwined. We do of course realise that the purpose of 
indoctrination through propaganda and the like is essentially different from the theory 
of banal nationalism, yet they do move in common areas, and in North Korea's case, 
through many of the same means, though not necessarily on the same levels of 
consciousness. 
Billig addresses what other scholars would call a limitation to banal nationalism in the 
start of his book: “Some analysts are currently arguing that the nation-state belongs to  
the modern age and is being superseded in the postmodern, globalised world”(Billig, 
1995: 11) He even goes as far as saying “If this is the case, then banal nationalism is a  
disappearing ideology, with a politics of identity replacing the old politics of  
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nationhood.”(Billig, 1995: 11) What we can gather from this is that some analysts 
would argue banal nationalism to be remnant of a past where the nation was at the 
centre of a person’s world, something we would suggest they do not believe to be the 
current case. There are examples of supranational units that one could argue is vying for 
a greater influence in our lives and identity (such as the EU), but more to the point of 
the analysts’ critique is that banal nationalism might be outdated due to the fact that  
personal identity steps to the fore, instead of the old focus on nationality. While this 
thought may or may not have merit in some countries around the world, it is certainly 
not our view on North Korea. North Korea, being a hermit-state and with a strong 
emphasis on the “us” and “them” as evident in the project, seems ideal for the theory of 
banal nationalism. Billig argues that the nation-states of today are by no means the first 
nations. One has to look no further than renaissance Italy or even the Ottoman Empire 
of the 20th century to see the merit in this argument. He believes that nations are not set 
in stone and as long as one can imagine a homeland, banal nationalism can exist: “This  
does not have to be a country, earlier it was maybe just a valley, but the homeland is  
seen as a unity, with both a totality and particularities (oceans, country side, sky  
scrapers etc.).” (Billig 1995: 74-75)
Max Weber's theory on political legitimacy has been the benchmark for looking at 
leaders' legitimacy for many years, but the theory could be showing its age. As it was 
written in the late 1800s, the establishments of contemporary politics have changed 
drastically since then. With arguments touching upon central topics such as the 
introduction of constant media awareness and a general education of the population, 
several contemporary scientists have questioned the validity of Weber's theory in the 
21st century. A movement spearheaded by French scientist Mattei Dogan (Dogan 2003: 
116-219) even declared Weber’s theories obsolete in the 21st century. We still believe, 
however, that there is some merit in Weber's understanding, and while they perhaps 
cannot be completely used in modern society as they could in the late 19th century, their 
general ideas still deserves serious consideration when discussing ideas on how a 
political figure gains influence and maintains it in his area of effect.
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3. Theoretical Approach 
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will go in depth with the theories we are going to use. We are mainly 
working with the works of Max Weber, but also the concept of banal nationalism.
3.2 Max Weber and the Weberian approach
Weberism, in contrast to Marx uses a very academic approach in order to understand 
sociology as an academic discipline. Max Weber, German sociologist, realised that the 
structures of society are to be explained both historically and sociologically, and he 
described the distinction between these as follows:
“Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalised uniformities of empirical 
processes. This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented to the causal analysis and 
explanation of the individual actions, structures, and personalities possessing cultural 
significance. "... [The ideal procedure is to make] the sure imputation of individual  
concrete events occurring in historical reality to concrete, historically given causes  
through the study of precise empirical data which have been selected from specific  
points of view." (Ritser 1992: 112-114)
In adopting this method, Weber clearly establishes himself as an historical sociologist; 
He considered the study and examination of empirical data vital and demanded that this 
data be selected with care and interpreted in order for a sociologist to develop concepts 
and "generalised uniformities of empirical processes." 
One example of how Weber uses these observations is written in The Protestant Ethic  
and the Spirit of Capitalism. Compared to Marx, Weber was far less attracted to the idea 
of "laws" by which society is described, and was also less occupied with creating an 
overall theoretical model of society and its development. Rather, Weber was impressed 
with the difficulty of understanding society, and by its complexity. He uses many more 
concepts than Marx and does not develop these into a single, theoretical model. As a 
result, Weber's concepts and methods are usually more specific and less general than 
those of Marx but are applicable to a broad range of social issues.
In addition to the large structural features and observed regularities, both Marx and 
Weber considered human action to be an important feature of social structure and social 
change. Weber argued that sociologists can develop an understanding of actions of 
individuals and groups, and thereby of historical processes; a process he described as 
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”Verstehen” or “understanding”, where a sociologist becomes empathetic with the 
individual, and develops an understanding of what meanings are attached to a course of 
action by an individual. Understanding and meaning are key elements of Weber's 
approach – these are not just intuition or sympathy with the individual, but the product 
of "systematic and rigorous research" (Ritser 1992: 116).
“We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences,  
namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals”. 
(Weber, 1978: 15).
Richard Hadden, author of “Sociological theory: an introduction to classical tradition”, 
emphasises the method of ideal types developed by Weber as a way of "comparing the 
grounds and consequences of action in different historical contexts" (Hadden 1997: 
127-8). These ideal types are concepts developed by the social scientists to isolate key 
features of interest to the analyst, permitting comparison of various aspects of social 
action in different societies over time. For Weber, these help to "achieve a causal  
explanation of results by isolating the key feature in two or more cases" (Hadden 1997: 
128). Among ideal types are the protestant ethic, the spirit of capitalism, rationality, and 
bureaucracy – concepts that are constructed by the social scientist through careful study, 
observation, and thought. While all social scientists develop concepts that crystallise 
particular aspects of society in a way that a theoretical model can be built, Weber 
outlined his methodology in more detail than most writers. His method of ideal types 
has been widely adopted by sociologists and his methodological writings constitute an 
important basis for sociological methodology.
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3.3 Political Legitimacy
In order to understand why a regime of the likes of the Kim family can rule without 
competition, we must look towards the concept of legitimising power, because a 
potential revolt is based on a general feel of the public that the current power has lost its 
legitimacy and thus needs to be replaced by another form of rule. It is one of the oldest 
discussions in politics:
”Why should citizens feel obliged to acknowledge the authority of government, do they  
have a duty to respect the state and obey its laws?” (Heywood 2007: 219)
Although the modern debate focuses more on why people do obey a particular system 
or state, rather than why they should obey any rule, the most basic and common 
contribution to understanding political and social legitimacy as a sociological 
phenomenon was presented by Max Weber, who comprised his ”ideal types” in order to 
break up authority into 3 primary forms:
 - Traditional Authority
 - Charismatic Authority
 - Legal-rational Authority
Traditional authority, s the name would suggest, is built on well-established traditions 
and customs. Its legitimacy is based on a rule that ”has always existed” and has 
therefore been sanctified by history, because previous subordinates have followed these 
traditions and been content with them. It is therefore ”firm and immutable” so to say, 
and it cannot, and should not be challenged. It is in today’s society, mostly found in 
small groups and institutions such as matriarchalism, where the mother is the 
undisputed leader of the household, or if you want to look at it on a larger scale, the 
dynastic rules of Brunei and Oman that still proceed in a form of Sultanate – another 
form of traditional authority. One must remember, however, that these Sultanates are 
not to be confused with constitutionalised western monarchies such as those in 
Denmark or Norway, which have little to no real power, but help shape political views 
through values such as respect and duty.
Charismatic Authority is based on a person's charisma (a person’s capacity to establish 
leadership through psychological control over others) with little to no basis in a person's 
social or political status, the personal appeal of a ”saint” or ”hero” gives the person a 
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power that, while fragile, can be extremely powerful. Some examples include political 
leaders of the past such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Adolf Hitler or Nicolae Ceaușescu, who 
were seen almost as deities or messiahs by their people. If manufactured correctly (the 
charisma is not alone a natural thing and must be carefully created through propaganda 
and public perception), there are virtually no limits to ones options and power. However 
it has proven difficult for regimes to outlive their founding fathers, as seen with Hitler 
or Mussolini whose political ideologies crumbled soon after their respective deaths.
Legal-Rational Authority is the most common type of authority in the western world 
since the end of the second world war, combining a charismatic leader with a formal 
constitutional set of rules, it combines the two types of authority mentioned above by 
establishing a middle ground, where a charismatic leader is elected into a set of rules to 
ensure that he or she can accomplish what the public wants without abusing the power 
given to them.
There is however an alternative to Weber's approach. Created by the famous German 
philosopher Karl Marx, whose view on legitimacy, as interpreted by traditional Marxist 
scholars, is that it is a myth created by the bourgeoisie, although modern Marxists have 
changed their interpretation to include the concept of legitimacy, although they do not  
view it the way Weber does. They agree that a capitalist/western society is upheld by 
establishing support, yet they are unnerved by the seemingly uneven class system as 
explained in ”Legitimising Crisis” (Habermas:1973, cited in Heywood:2007) by Jürgen 
Habermas, German philosopher, as a series of ”crisis tendencies” within capitalist 
societies that make it difficult for them to maintain political stability through consent  
alone. Habermas argues that tension creates a tug-of-war between pressures of the 
public on one side, and economic logic on the other. He suggests that a capitalist 
government therefore cannot permanently satisfy both popular demands for social 
welfare and the free market economy of private profit. Thus, he concludes that 
legitimacy cannot be maintained in the long term as revolt is unavoidable.
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3.4 Banal Nationalism
In the context of the legitimacy in North Korea, the thoughts on power in within the 
regime, and especially the later segment on indoctrination. We believe to be useful to 
including a segment on one of the means by which a regime can enforce nationalism in 
a country. We believe this to be an important addition due to the great emphasis put on 
patriotism and loyalty towards Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il.
While nationalism in several parts of the world might be considered a volatile word due 
to the historical and political connotations, it also has much more casual meaning, such 
as the simple reproduction of nationhood. By this we mean the reproduction that occurs 
all over the world, all the time, often in the form of symbols, anthems and special 
occasions. This form of reproduction of nationhood is something Michael Billig, British 
professor of social sciences, coined as “banal nationalism”. Banal nationalism, however, 
is not simply these relatively innocent things such as anthems, it is also the driving 
force of emotions of such a magnitude that it can lead to the creation of wars, and more 
importantly for our project, it has made these wars seem necessary. (Billig, 1995)
In Billig's book on the theory of banal nationalism, he argues that for a person to have 
feelings of patriotism towards his country, that same person also needs to have a 
picture, or understanding of what this nation is, and what patriotism is, or in Billig’s 
words: “the so-called inner psychological states of individuals depend upon culturally  
shared depictions, or representations of the social world.” (Billig on Serge Moscovici, 
1995: 60)
A main tenet in Billig's understanding of a national identity is that we, as mankind, 
always wish to portray ourselves in a positive light, and for us to do that we need to 
portray someone else in a negative light. Thus the stereotype of “us” and “them” enters 
the equation. “The flattering stereotypes, held by the in-group, and the unflattering ones  
about the out-groups, will maintain the positive self-identity, which is necessary for the  
group’s continuing existence”. (Billig, 1995: 66) Another key tenet of Billig's 
understanding is that nationalism, unlike other group identities1, is not something that 
we as people can turn off or ignore, it is a way of life: national identity is more than an  
inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a form of life, which is  
daily lived in the world of nation states.” (Billig 1995: 69)
Billig talks about the production and reproduction of nationalism as “The ideological  
habits, by which “our” nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and thereby  
1  These group identities can be nearly everything: A group of people wearing something special, a 
group of people cheering for the same football team, or even a political identity such as liberalist or 
socialist.
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unnoticed.” (Billig 1995: 6) while we have already accounted for some of the more 
obvious means of producing nationalism, such as anthems, flags and so forth, there are 
also a lot of means by which to produce this nationalism in ways that go unnoticed. 
These are the means Billig specifically looks at in his theory of banal nationalism. He 
argues that we only notice the bad reproductions of national identity, and not the ones 
that “... hardly register in the flow of daily attention, as citizens rush past on their daily  
business” (Billig, 1995: 38), even though they sustain this national identity on a much 
more regular basis. 
Billig goes on to comment how flags for an example have a dual nature, in the sense 
that it is indeed noticed when one sees pictures of soldiers saluting flags, as if that flag 
was the representation of their country, a representation of their pride towards their 
given nature, but at the same time, the flag is a banal reproduction of nationhood. It is, 
quite simply context based. One very obvious example is the above mentioned with the 
soldier. Some are less obvious, such as flags hanging in public spaces, or on the license 
plates of cars: “One can ask what are all these unwaved flags doing, not just in the USA  
but around the world? In an obvious sense, they are providing banal reminders of  
nationhood, they are ‘flagging’ it unflaggingly”(Billig, 1996: 41). But why are these 
symbols, such as the “unwaved flag” and the flags on license plates so important? They 
are important for the very reason that they enforce this banal nationhood. When the 
symbols are obvious they tend to be chastised for being extremist. They exist in many 
forms2 in our everyday lives, but are rarely noticed: “If banal life is to be routinely  
practised, then this form of remembering must occur, without conscious awareness: it  
occurs when one is doing other things, including forgetting.” (Billig 1995: 42)
So why are these unnoticed, forgotten symbols so important? Borrowing inspiration 
from Pierre Bourdieu and his thoughts on “habitus”(Billig, 1995: 42), Billig proposes 
that these symbols, be they objects or history, because of their nature influences us in an 
unnoticed fashion and creates what Billig calls enhabitation, which is basically these 
unnoticed symbols becoming a part of you, and thus makes you share the sentiment of 
your given country, which can lead to voluntarily making the ultimate sacrifice in 
defence of your mother- or fatherland. Billig gives an example of exactly this, early in 
his book. His example is in the form of sports pages in a newspaper: “They can be seen  
as banal rehearsals for the extraordinary times of crisis, when the state calls upon its  
citizenry, and especially its male citizenry, to make ultimate sacrifices in the cause of  
nationhood” (Billig, 1995: 11)
2  Events, money, history, language and many other forms exist without notice.
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4. Contextualisation chapter
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we are going to outline everything that is needed to know before 
beginning with the analysis. We will start with a brief outline of the history of North 
Korea to ensure that the reader has a basic knowledge of the country's recent historical 
past. In this way we assume that the reader will gain a sufficient level of knowledge in 
order to understand the analysis.  
We will also write about five of the most historically known approaches to communism, 
as laid out in different countries or by different leaders. The ideologies we are going to 
work with are: Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, and Juche.
4.2 A brief history of North Korea and Kim Il-Sung 
In 1945, Japanese forces surrendered Korea to the United Nations after 35 years of 
colonisation, rendering a division of the country. The infamous 38th parallel demarcated 
the administrative territories of the Soviet Union and the United States, as they did not 
reach consensus on the political future of Korea.
Kim Il-Sung, born in 1912, was a guerilla leader who had fought the Japanese and had 
been pressured out of Korea and into the Soviet Union in 1940-41. Among other 
Koreans from the Soviet Korean community, he was tasked within the field of 
administration in the Soviet part of Korea, and he arrived in his hometown of 
Pyongyang in 1945. He was engaged in reunifying the country. Besides becoming head 
of the northern branch of the Korean Communist Party, he was later, in 1946, number 
two in the North Korean Workers' Party and chairman of the North Korean Provisional 
People's Committee – this committee was, under the USSR, the government of the 
northern part of the peninsula. (Hoare & Pares, 205: 3-6)
Two years later, in 1948, two states emerged: DPRK: the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea, and ROK: the Republic of Korea – the former being North and the latter 
South Korea. The southern part emerged on August 15. It had the attributes of a 
"western" democracy with a liberalised market, while the northern part, which was 
founded on September 9, became a classic Marxist-Leninist state – a political structure 
still officially held today.
In 1949, the North and South Korean Workers' Parties merged into one political entity 
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with aspirations of unifying the country under one communist rule. Guerrilla groups in 
mountainous regions of South Korea kept up communist campaigns and were ready to 
revolt against their 'westernised' state. Besides that, the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet 
troops from the Korean peninsula rendered North Korea with superior military 
capabilities, especially in terms of tanks, aircraft and experienced soldiers. Thus, the 
DPRK engaged on a military invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 in an attempt to 
coin the two Koreas into one. Although the North Korean forces managed to take Seoul 
within three days, their communication lines were overextended as they continued to 
seize new territory, and the expected uprising amongst the South Korean people failed 
to materialise on a large enough scale. (Hoare & Pares, 2005: 25-27)
A proxy war occurred as U.S. and U.N. troops came to aid South Korea and pushed 
back the opposing force well beyond the 38th parallel, but China deployed soldiers onto 
North Korean soil to defend it. This has been said to be "the first significant armed  
conflict of the cold war". (Hermes 2002: 6-9)
The invasion was backed up by the Soviet Union in two senses: first, by condemning 
the UN council meetings, and second, by supporting both the DPRK and the newborn 
People's Republic of China with military equipment.
After three years of territorial conflict and roughly three million lives lost, an armistice 
was agreed upon. In 1953, the Korean Demilitarised zone was official: A 4 kilometre 
buffer zone dividing the two states. This is the only agreed arrangement of the Korean 
Peninsula to this day. The wish for reunification has not disappeared, but over the 
course of the last half of the twentieth century, it was subordinate to the priorities of 
state-building and economic development.
By 1972, Kim Il-Sung had always been seen as the head of DPRK politics, and 
somewhere in the process, he had hijacked the KWP from being a Marxist-Leninist 
party to a support system for his personal life. That year, he managed to change the 
constitution to represent the authority of him and his northern supporters.
"Then it was that Marxist-Leninism became associated with the indigenous Juche  
philosophy" (Hoare & Pages, 2005: 6)
Since its birth, the DPRK had experienced a rapid industrialisation due to assistance 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and by the early 1970's, it was recognised as 
the leading industrialised country of East Asia, along with Japan. The success had not 
come without a price though: North Korea was viewed as one of the most tightly ruled 
political units in the world, and with the absorption of all social organs, ordinary civil 
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society practically disappeared. The political power of the state was now centred on 
Kim Il-Sung and a small group of supporters consisting of family members and men 
who had fought alongside Kim in the guerilla war against Japan. The rest of the KWP 
had been eliminated or neutralised in the meantime, as neither supported the groups that 
they had originally sponsored. 
In 1973, Kim Il-Sung appointed his son, Kim Jong-Il, as his successor. About ten years 
passed before Kim Jong-Il began to appear in public - by his father's side. And when 
Kim Il-Sung, the Eternal Leader, died in 1994, his son, the Dear Leader, succeeded him 
in practice. In 1997 he assumed the role of secretary-general of the KWP, and since 
September 1998 and onwards, he has officially ruled the nation as head of the military 
(since the presidential title is reserved for his deceased father.
The economic strength of the DPRK had begun to falter in the early 1970s. A large 
input of capital was required in order to support the government's insistence on 
developing heavy industry as the lead capital, along with the burden of an immense 
military budget. The productivity dropped as a result of the work-force's diminishing 
acceptance of moral incentives. In short, "the need to prove constantly the superiority of  
the North Korean economic model, while subjugating the economy to ideological and  
political ends, confined it in a straitjacket and stunned its growth." (Hoare and Pares 
2005: 28)
Other factors played in; Equipment obtained in the preceding decades was wearing out, 
and commodity prices fell drastically as a result of the 1973 world oil crisis, hitting the 
DPRK hard. The North Korean economy continued to wane as China began to move 
towards a market economy in 1978, causing an end to "friendship prices". And when 
the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist systems started collapsing, the 
DPRK lost great sources of material assistance and favourable trading terms. On top of 
all this, the country suffered from a series of natural disasters between 1994-98, which 
led to a grave famine, as the already over-exploited agricultural structure was damaged 
immensely. (Hoare and Pares, 2010: 27-29)
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4.3 Contemporary North Korea
How is it possible for the North Korean regime to stay in power? According to Byman 
and Lind, this phenomenon can be explained through analysing three key points: first, 
that the very structure of the regime is built in such a way that it is invulnerable to 
coups d'états or revolutions – North Korean institutions are structured in ways that 
detect any anti-regime activity going on among the elites. Military leaders are rather  
accepted for their loyalty than competence, and the creation of parallel security forces 
has rendered the state coup-proof. The social engineering of North Korea is conducted 
in such a way that the very building blocks of opposition are lacking. There is no 
merchant or land-owning class, no independent unions, and no clergy. Strict restrictions 
on the activities of students have cowed them into submission, and last, but not least, 
the intellectuals of the state are regime-loyal bureaucrats, not dissidents. The regime's 
use of force is brutal; an elaborate network of informants, working for multiple internal 
security agencies, functions as a helping hand for detecting dissent among the citizens, 
and the punishment is harsh. Those accused of minor offences undergo "re-education", 
but those accused of more serious matters are either interred in miserable political 
prison camps or executed immediately. In addition, according to the "three generations" 
policy, criminals are not punished individually, but their families receive punishment as 
well.
Second, popular nationalism is invoked by international provocations. Although the 
regime has been called erratic or crazy, it operates on the grounds of a certain rationale 
that boosts the military's domestic position. The regime's legitimacy is sustained by 
nationalistic propaganda – sentiments towards Japan, South Korea and USA are 
reinforced by the xenophobic traits of the Juche ideology. The greatest threat to the 
regime seems to be the challenge of succession. Before Kim Il-Sung's death in 1994, he 
had ensured a smooth transfer of power for his son, Kim Jong-Il. Similar preparations 
have not yet been made for the next successor, and this could turn out to be very 
damaging to the proliferation of the Kim regime. Some analysts have argued that the 
North Korean nuclear and missile tests of 2009 and the attack on a South Korean 
warship in the following year were aimed at a domestic audience – the argument is that 
a weak DPRK regime is attempting to shore up support from the military in advance of 
succession.
Third, sanctions are being cleverly abused to divert the punishment onto the people, 
leaving the "bourgeoisie" even more powerful. Members of the ruling class are "bribed" 
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with rewards such as more and better food – a perk that protected the country's core 
class throughout the famine. Through a system of measuring the loyalty towards the 
regime amongst the people, those people deemed least loyal were the ones who suffered 
most severely from the famine - nearly 1 million North Koreans died. Although 
promises of denuclearisation has been used to receive more than $6 billion in aid (as of 
July 2010), the regime still bestows an alleged 25 % of the national budget to the 
military. Also, key stakeholder countries reject these sanctions due to the fear of the 
chaos that is likely to follow a collapse of the DPRK. (Byman & Lind: 2010) 
4.4 Comparison between different communist ideologies
In this part we will compare some of the most historically known communist 
ideologies. As it would be nearly impossible to treat all Marxist/socialist/communist 
theories, this will only deal with the five most relevant in our comparison with Juche. 
Neither will we make a thorough explanation of the whole theoretical background of 
the different ideologies, only explain the main differences and common characteristics. 
4.4.1 Marxist socialism/communism
With the 'Communist Manifesto' from 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published 
one of the most influential political texts ever. In the manuscript, the authors outlined 
their ideas about the state, people and social classes. (McLean & MacMillan: 2009)
Marxism is the most 'pure' form of communism, and is also the official name of what is 
being referred to colloquially as 'communism'.
The revolution will lead to a 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which is only a 
transitionary phase until the completely classless, stateless society is reached. This 
phase is referred to as 'socialism' while the end goal is 'full communism' where no form 
of exchange can take place. (Scruton 2007: 119) 
The main slogan of socialism and communism is “From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his need” (Marx, in Scruton 2007: 119). This, in short terms, means 
that you will receive everything you need from the state, but in change you have to 
work as much as you can – implied that the strongest man shall lift the heaviest weight. 
In the original Marxist point of view, the 'revolution' is about social change; where one 
mode of production, i.e. economic system, is replaced by another (mainly referring to 
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communism replacing capitalism). Therefore, one can argue that the American 
revolution of 1774 is not a revolution in this sense, because, although it brought 
independence, the social structure was left intact. Furthermore, in this sense revolutions 
are not necessarily as abrupt as the etymology and normal use of the word implies. An 
example of this could be the Russian revolution which started in 1917 and continued 
until the fall of the USSR in 1991 – its goals of building a true communist society not 
yet having been reached. (Heywood 2007: 224-25)
According to Marx, industrialisation is a necessary precondition for building socialism, 
and this also explains why he did not believe that the pains involved in industrialisation 
processes were socialist processes. All in all, Marx was very reluctant of agricultural 
societies as he thought it was old-fashioned and that it restrains industrialisation. He 
was once cited for saying: 
“the country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less 
developed the image of its own future.” 
(Marx, cited in Gills & Qadir 1995: 19)
Critics use contemporary underdeveloped countries for stating that a rural society does 
not have the intellectual capacity to undertake a revolution, and therefore cannot 
establish a socialist society. Marxist Paul A. Baran stated in the 1950s that: 
“socialism in backward and underdeveloped countries has a powerful tendency 
to become a backward and underdeveloped socialism.” 
(P.A. Baran, cited in Gills & Qadir 1995: 19).
 Adrian Leftwich, the author of the chapter 'Is there a Socialist Path to Socialism' in 
Gills & Qadir (1995) takes this further, concluding that true socialism could never be 
fulfilled in poor, agrarian societies, neither in 
“authoritarian developmental states and their commonly top-down planning 
systems; with regional, cultural, religious or ethnic nationalisms and 
antagonisms; and with fatalistic or religious views of the world, wherever they 
may be held” (Gills & Qadir 1995: 21)
Finally, he ends the paragraph by stating that socialism requires psychological and 
emotional maturity from the individual, and even though this is found to some extend in 
some societies, 
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“they are probably too thinly distributed in any given population anywhere for 
socialism to work at the moment, irrespective of the structural character of the 
society” (Gills & Qadir 1995: 21)
Critics of Marx has called his ideas “Opium of the intellectuals”, referring partly to the 
belief that communism in its true form can never be carried out (Scruton 2007: 426).
4.4.2 Leninism
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was the mastermind of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, which 
resulted in him being the first leader of the USSR. Lenin contributed to Marxism with 
his theory of the revolutionary party, his analysis on 'colonialism as an economic 
phenomenon' and his commitment to the 'insurrectionary road to socialism'. There are 
different views on Lenin's influence. Some see him as the main contributor to the 
Stalinist oppression; others praise him as a critic of bureaucracy and a defender of 
debate and argument.
As mentioned, Lenin differed from Karl Marx by the belief that, in order to reach the 
goal of pure communism, there had to be a vanguard party to lead the revolution and 
hold the political power after it. Lenin believed that, without the vanguard party, the 
proletariat would adopt the bourgeois ideology. (McLean & McMillan: 2009)
This belief – that the revolution has to be made by a small group of 'professional 
revolutionists' – makes the Russian revolution look more like a coup d'état than a 
popular revolution, since it was not the spirit of the people that created it, but the elite 
of the proletariat.  (Heywood: 2007)
4.4.3 Stalinism
“A radical variant of Leninism” (Cheong 2000: 133).
According to Heywood, the core of Stalinism builds on “central planning and brutal 
political discipline” (Heywood 2007: 458). 
Josef Vissarionovich Dshugashvili adopted the name Stalin, which means 'Man of 
Steel', while he was a part of the Bolsheviks before the revolution (McLean and 
McMillan 2009: 506). Stalin shared the beliefs of Lenin, but did not agree with him on 
how to reach the objective. His totalitarian rule included him taking over control of the 
media and using it for propaganda purposes, and systematic elimination of the 
opposition and all who criticised the system. (Scruton 2007: 662)
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Stalin also made five year plans in order to secure production by force. He was very 
obsessed with enforcing the economic and industrial competitive position. In 1931, he 
spoke about quickening the pace of industrialisation:
“To slacken pace would mean to lag behind: and those who lag behind are 
beaten. We do not want to be beaten … Russia was ceaselessly beaten for her 
backwardness … For military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for 
agricultural, for industrial backwardness … We are fifty of a hundred years 
behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either 
we do this or they crush us.” (Stalin, cited in Gills & Qadir 1995: 25)
All in all, one could state that USSR at no point resembled the ideal socialist state, but it  
could be counter argued that USSR was simply the vanguard state on the way to true 
communism, which Lenin and Stalin believed.
4.4.4 Maoism
Mao Zedong was the leader of the People's Republic of China from 1949-1976. After 
becoming the leader of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 he took on Marxism-
Leninism and made it fit the poor, agricultural Chinese society. (Heywood: 2007)
His biggest campaigns were 'the great leap forward' in 1958 and the cultural revolution 
of 1965.
During the 1960s his ideology was quite influential around the world, but since the true 
face of Maoism has been uncovered through research, most of his followers stopped 
sharing his ideals. Mao invented a term called 'Political epistemology' which in short 
requires people to revolutionise themselves in order to revolutionise society. People 
have to realise what they are capable of changing themselves and secure changes. 
“The correct line is formed in the struggle with the incorrect line” (Scruton 2007: 418), 
meaning that opposition and conflict must exist before something good can be formed. 
Furthermore, the revolution is not a final resolution, but merely a move in the right 
direction. 
For Mao, the cultural revolution is more important than the industrial revolution, 
because it will create new modes of knowledge and hereby enable people to perceive 
the value of industrialisation. Somewhat opposing to this, Mao found manual labour 
superior to intellectual labour, which should gradually be eliminated (Scruton 2007: 
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418).
According to McLean and McMillan (2009), it was not an aversion against capitalism, 
but a kind of warlordism that attracted Mao to Marxism, i.e. the possibility to unite 
China through a Leninist-like cadre party. 
The peasantry was very important in Mao's mind. He developed a mass-line leadership 
theory which in essence is a process of mutual education between leaders and the led. 
Mao formulated it this way: 
“Take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and 
concentrate them (through study, turn them into concentrated and systematic 
ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the 
masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into 
action … such is the Marxist theory of knowledge” 
(McLean & McMillan 2009: 330)
4.4.5 Juche
Juche is a Korean word usually translated as "self-reliance." Referring in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea specifically to a political thesis of Kim Il-sung, 
the “Juche Idea”, which identifies the Korean masses as the masters of the country's 
development (Cumings: 2005).
Juche was first officially used in a speech given by Kim Il-sung on December 28, 1955, 
entitled "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in 
Ideological Work." During this speech, Kim urged communist party members not to 
import ideas from the USSR, but to view Korea as a revolutionary nation on its own 
merit. He stated, “To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and 
geography as well as the customs of the Korean people. Only then is it possible to 
educate our people in a way that suits them and to inspire in them an ardent love for 
their native place and their motherland.” (Cumings: 2005: 421)
Originally seen by Kim as a progression of Marxism-Leninism (Cumings: 2005), Juche 
is defined by 3 pillars of the political system, which have been greatly revisited and 
expanded since their inception in 1955, and all the way through to Kim Il-Sung's death 
in 1994; although the concepts remain the same:
Political independence [Chaju]
Economic self-sustenance [Charip]
Self-reliance in defence [Chawi]
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Each pillar has its own ways and significance to the way a state is run.
Chaju puts an emphasis on Domestic and Foreign independence and a belief that every 
state has the right of self-determination in order to secure the happiness and prosperity 
of its people as it best sees fit. (Lee: 2003) Chaju is exemplified in North Korea by its 
reluctance to associate itself directly with its communist allies, the Soviet Union and 
The People's Republic of China, of which Kim Il-Sung wanted mutual support but 
limited dependence. This is due to the fact that according to Juche, as it is interpreted by 
the leaders of North Korea, yielding to foreign pressure or tolerating foreign 
intervention would make it impossible to maintain Chaju, or the defence of national 
independence and sovereignty (Lee: 2003) which is the main point of Chawi, which we 
will come to later.
Before that, we must consider the second pillar of Juche, “Charip” or Economic 
independence as it is most oft translated. Charip is seen as the material basis in order to 
achieve Chaju, because Kim Il-Sung feared that a dependence on economic aid from 
foreign countries would cripple the state into being a satellite for the wealthier nations 
that provided the aid. Kim decided that the best way to approach this build-up of a 
country into economic dependence was by creating a base in heavy industry and 
machinery that could in turn provide technology and knowledge into the light industry, 
agriculture and other parts of the economy. (Lee: 2003)
Finally, there is Chawi, most commonly referred to as Military Independence, most 
notably quoted by Kim Jong-Il: “We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we 
beg peace from the imperialists.” (Jong Il: 1990) A strong army is seen as a must in 
order to protect the solitary state that gives one the best chance of retaining true 
independence and self-reliance. Grace Lee of Stanford University explains it as such: 
“The implementation of this self-reliant defence system would involve the mobilisation 
of the whole country and the complete inculcation of ideology in the armed forces. 
Those who were not directly taking up arms were to contribute to the construction and 
maintenance of the domestic defence industry and remain ideologically prepared, so 
that the home front would be united in a sense of socio-political superiority” (Lee: 
2003) This pillar has been the most controversial to the outside world when regarding 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as this pillar is directly responsible for the 
massive Korean army and it’s interest in weapons technology. Although Chawi is 
translated as a defensive approach, another aspect of Juche is to fight for a sovereign, 
unified Korea under Juche rule via the “Democratic Front for the Reunification of the 
Fatherland”, and a lot of Juche is open to interpretation as it is as much a philosophy as 
a steadfast political rule. Therefore, concerns have been made in the west about a leader 
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such as Kim Jong-Il or suspected “heir to the throne” Kim Jong-Un interpreting the 
Chawi aspect of Juche in an aggressive way
These 3 pillars are the primary points in understanding Juche's political philosophy, and 
in some respect its teachings of life. “The Juche Idea means, in brief, that the masters  
of the Revolution and Socialist Construction are the masses of the people.” (Cumings: 
2005) With people as the masters of nature in creating one’s own revolution and 
success, Juche is an idea which from the outside looks a lot like the Marxist-Leninist 
roots of which it is based. Important concepts here are revolution, the fight against 
imperialism and creating a country devoid of dependency towards other nations. In 
theory this would create a self sufficient, strong state with complete independence, 
although it, as a political theory, has seen revision since its inception the 3 base pillars 
are still evident in the only country yet to adopt it as a full political plan.
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5. Analysis chapter
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we are going to make use of our theories in order to analyse our 
empirical material. This will allow us to answer our working questions. The first 
chapter compares different forms of communist ideologies with Juche. With the result 
of this comparative analysis in mind, we will carry out a political legitimacy analysis  
based on the theories of Max Weber and Michael Billig. We will also take a look at the 
process of indoctrination in the country, which is intricately connected with the 
educational system and use of media. 
In the beginning of each chapter we will write the respective working question and key 
assumption that the specific analysis will be about. 
5.2 Working question 1
What are the main characteristics and differences between the various forms of  
communist inspired ideology, and how does juche compare? 
Key assumption: Juche’s status as a state philosophy has succeeded in keeping one 
single family in power for more than 60 years creating an Autocracy.
As it has perhaps been implied earlier in this project, Juche does not look much like 
other kinds of Marx-offspring ideologies. The differences between the ideologies have 
been lined out in the contextualisation chapter, so in this part we will analyse this 
information in order to find out what the specifics of Juche really are. Of course it has 
its foundation in Marxist ideas, but as also stated earlier, Kim Il-sung changed the 
characteristics to fit the population of North Korea and his own beliefs. 
Many sources independently state that Juche is very creative in its adaption of other 
communist ideas. For example, Seong-Chang Cheong senior research fellow at the 
Sejong institute (a South Korean think tank), in his article in “Asian Perspective” 
(2000) writes about how Kim Il-Sung and later Kim Jong-Il modified the ideology of 
North Korea:
“The idea of juche, which insists on a “creative” application of Stalin’s version 
of Marxism-Leninism in the Korean context, took shape in the mid-1960s. After 
1967, through then movement for the establishment of a monolithic ideological 
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system, uniquely Korean in character, juche began acquiring independent albeit  
superficial features that distinguished it from the imported Stalinism. […] in 
1976, Kim Jong Il’s description of Kimilsungism went even further, stating that 
it was “a unique ideology, the contents and structure of which cannot be 
described simply as Marxist-Leninist.”(Cheong 2000: 139)
First, it is important to make clear what Cheong means by 'Kimilsungism'. Obviously, 
he describes it as the ideology of Kim Il-Sung which covers the state construction and 
socialist revolution of North Korea, i.e. the whole system of power that was in function 
during his actual rule of North Korea. We are stressing the term actual rule because 
Kim Il-Sung is still the official president of North Korea, even though he died in 1994. 
The official title of Kim Jong-Il, who is actually leading the country now, is Supreme 
Leader. (Sang-Hun:2009) 
This is certain evidence on the cult of personality that is formed around Kim Il-Sung, 
we will return to later in this later. 
The quote from Cheong clearly shows one argument among many that Kim Il-Sung has 
from the beginning not wanted to 'import' a finished ideology, or has at least changed it 
quite fast. 
A big difference from Juche to Stalin's ideas of “Communism in one country” is that 
Kim Il-Sung believed that a revolution has to take place in the whole world before full 
communism can be achieved. This means that even though the communist revolution is 
successfully undertaken in one country, the dictatorship of the proletariat has to stay in 
function as long as capitalism is existent somewhere in the world. 
This opposes to the Communist Manifesto where Marx and Engels do not have any true 
theory about how to conduct the revolution, nor do they have any detailed blueprints for 
organisation of a post-revolution society – they even criticised many of such blueprints 
for being utopian. (Cheong 2000: 139) 
Different dimensions and angles have been added by other thinkers since the deaths of 
Marx and Engels; thus one might argue that these ideas are more contemporary, and 
therefore, these other isms related to Marxism can be called revised versions of the 
original, in the context of the respective places in history. This is by no means to state 
that the original ideology is outdated, but merely to give a hint on how much diversity 
there can be within one single ideological framework. 
To go back to the matter of the revolution, North Korea should accordingly be ready to 
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move into the next phase of revolution towards full communism when the rest of the 
world is. The question is if Kim Jong-Il wants this at all. One could get the idea that the 
Kims have been creating and altering the policy merely for the family to stay in power 
of the country – a thing they have succeeded in for more than 60 years. This is partly 
because Kim Il-Sung has managed to alter the rules so that he could appoint his friends 
and family to important and strategically smart posts.
This is seen in the fact that the Supreme Leader has complete authority in all regards, 
such as law, administration and regulations. In Korean terms this rule is sometimes 
called “yuil cheje” which, according to Cheong, means a monolithic system. This term 
might very well be North Korea's way of making a 'positive' autocracy. (Cheong 2000: 
146)
This adds to the idea of a 'cult of personality' around Kim Il-Sung and to some degree 
his family. The North Korean media has gone from simply calling him the leader of the 
North Korean people, through 'leader of all international progressive movements and 
forces', to ' the Great leader of mankind'. This is a term which Kim Il-Sung used himself 
when talking about Stalin. After Kim Il-Sung's death, as mentioned before, the 
constitution was changed so that he would keep the title of President for eternity. The 
'head of state’, or the highest ruling leader would then be called 'supreme leader'. 
(Cheong 2000: 149)
No matter what he is called, the dear leader might not be that dear at all. There are 
several cases of Kim Il-Sung being very brutal to his political opposition. An example is 
the trials of Pak Hon-yong in 1953-1955, who was Kim Il-Sung’s main political rival. 
He was convicted of being “an entrenched spy of American imperialism”.
Besides Hon-yong, there are believed to be somewhere between 150.000-200.000 
political prisoners in North Korea. Many of these are in “labour re-education camps”, or 
basically concentration camps. (Cheong 2000: 151)
Many things point towards the idea that the North Korean rule might actually have quite 
a lot of the characteristics of an autocracy. According to Scruton , the main elements of 
an autocracy is:
“Literally self-rule, used to mean rule by an agent who holds all power himself,  
and who exercises that power in an arbitrary manner. There may be a  
constitution and laws which seem to limit or guide his power, but in fact these  
can be revoked at will by the autocrat, and also disobeyed by him, there being  
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no independent mechanisms for enforcing them.” (Scruton 2007: 48)
This seems to fit the rule of North Korea quite well. As we have implied earlier in this 
chapter, literally all of these factors are existent in North Korea. They have a 
constitution, but it has been changed several times by Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, 
most of the times to something more favourable for the Kims. This indicates that they 
can do almost what they want in the country, regardless of what the people think of it.
This is one big problem which we haven't really touched upon yet, namely the question 
of the North Korean people's dedication towards the Leader and the whole system:
“When it is said that the sustainability of the North Korean system is linked to  
the ideological solidarity of the North Korean people, one should not overlook  
the fact that a significant portion of its ideological solidarity originated from  
ideological indoctrination, from omnipresent agitation and thorough  
interception of foreign information (all radio receivers must be fixed to  
approved channels, access to foreign publications is limited, and travel is  
restricted), as well as from terror and concentration camps. The dedication of  
North Koreans to juche ideology, even if it appears “voluntary,” is artificially  
manufactured by the party’s extensive work on “ideological training” and  
“terror”.” (Cheong 2000: 157)
It is very hard to say whether the people of North Korea are actually this devoted to 
their Dear Leader, but this problem will be handled in the analysis of our third working 
question. 
Before we do this, we must first find out how the Kims have actually succeeded in 
controlling the people of North Korea for such a long time, and this is where our second 
working question comes in. 
33
5.3 Working question 2
From a Weberian point of view on legitimate rule, and through Billig’s theory of banal  
nationalism, what measures are taken by the regime to ensure loyalty and patriotism  
from the people of North Korea?
Key assumption: The fact that North Korea has been a warring nation for more than 60  
years has helped the Kim dynasty to stay in power.
In this chapter we will analyse the Political Legitimacy of the Kim Rule, both first and 
second generation, based on the ideal types that we have previously established in the 
Theory chapter. We will look at several examples including media and historical events 
of the Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il rule.
In order to understand why the people of North Korea stay loyal to a system that has 
shown a lack of ability to create sustainable growth and create a country that can 
provide for its people, we need to look into the types of political legitimacy, particularly 
Weber's concept of “Charismatic Leadership” which tells us that a leader can create or 
enhance his charismatic hold over the people to rise to a position of power, bypassing 
his original merits and status whatever they may be (Weber 1991: 246)
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is one of the only examples left in the 21st 
century where a charismatic leader stays in power by traditional means as used by 
former leaders such as Adolf Hitler, Hồ Chí Minh and the likes. Means that are based 
on a strong sense of propaganda where the leader in question is heightened to a deity-
like father figure for the country, encompassing all the values that the regime want the 
citisens to follow in order to create the country to satisfactory standards (Weber 1991: 
246).
Charismatic leaderships are often promoted in times of turmoil, often by war or poverty, 
the country seems to need a strong, charismatic leader to take control and guide the 
nation through the hardship. Like a father leading his family by being the patron, so will 
a charismatic head of state assume to role as “Father” of the nation and bring much 
needed stability. Kim Il-Sung of DPR Korea did this during the Korean War, 
establishing himself as “The Great Leader” in 1949 after establishing the Democratic 
Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (Becker:2005) before entering into the also 
newly formed South Korea, thus starting the Korean War in 1950. During the war, and 
especially afterwards we see Kim Il-Sung gaining more and more power over the 
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country of North Korea, firstly by establishing a “Command Economy” wherein 
business is owned completely by the state, thus creating one of the main pillars of his 
Juche philosophy (Eur: 2003). However, with the state in control of all agriculture and 
industry, Kim Il-Sung had gained complete control over his fellow countrymen, and 
created a country where the state was in charge of almost every business. As Weber tells 
us, this surge of power often weakens the power itself, and Kim Il-Sung saw his power 
weakened; reacting swiftly by spreading information about the United States spreading 
diseases amongst the people (Ryall: 2010), including a tyrannical purge of many 
civilians in order to scare people into acceptance of these accusations against the US. 
However, since people were accused of treason against the country, Kim Il-Sung's 
position as The Eternal Leader remained unquestioned, and Sung kept this position vital 
as he battled with USSR and China the next years switching sides in that conflict and 
maintaining an uneasy relationship with the South Koreans who he maintained was a 
satellite of the US and thus a fierce enemy in the battle against imperialism.
This continued “war” with South Korea and the unstable foreign relations with 
neighbour China and big brother Soviet Russia created the uncertainty that allowed Kim 
Il-Sung to continue his presence as a stable father figure who could lead the nation 
through these times. The uncertainty creates the need amongst the people for stability 
and strong leadership, and Kim Il-Sung's continuous efforts to establish himself as a 
leader of men and a stable pillar of respect and dignity, who will lead the people 
through a time of war.
This trend continued through the 1960s where Kim further expanded his hold on the 
country by creating more propaganda and spreading more fear in his war-torn nation, 
both on the threats from the “Imperialist” US, but also from the reformed Khrushchev-
led Soviet Union and Mao Zedong's China which Kim Il-Sung felt had wavered from 
its communist ideologies (Lee, 2003). Kim Il-Sung in contrast expanded Juche into 
ideas better suited for ruling his country. His 3 pillars Chaju, Chawi and Charip were 
implemented into society on a broader scale as the Democratic Republic of Korea 
moved away from the traditional communist powers and sided with more “extreme” 
Marxist-Leninist regimes such as Hồ Chí Minhs Vietnam and Nicolae Ceauşescu's 
Romania (Tolnay: 2001); the former included North Korean forces actively 
participating in the Vietnam war, both on Vietnamese soil, but also in aggression 
towards US and South Korean military along the demilitarised zone. Kim Il-Sung had 
thereby again thrown Korea into conflict and insecurity; a state which he used to gain 
more power by expanding the influence of his loyal allies in especially the Military, the 
Military itself profiting greatly from the warmongering, and with continuous insecurity 
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looming, the military profession was also seen as a safe economic job.
In 1972, Kim Il-Sung proclaimed a new constitution upon North Korea. With true allies 
limited to a handful of communist states, Kim Il-Sung proclaimed Juche the new 
official state ideology of the DPRK, replacing the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
(Yoon:2002). Juche had progressively been placed upon the population over the past 20 
years, and since Kim Il-Sung was the only authority on this life philosophy, it was clear 
that his role as a leader became more important for the state of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea to remain stable and on the path towards a unified Korea. Since then, 
Kim Il-Sung increased his hold on the population, and after he died in 1994, his son 
Kim Jong-Il took over as leader of Korea and continued the state run monopoly on 
media and religion (Lee: 2003) (even though religious freedom is a part of the Korean 
constitution it does not appear to be done in praxis, as Juche is the only religion taught 
in school).
And now with the history addressed, we turn to the “why”. It seems evident that the 
reason that the North Korean population seemingly trusts and loves the Kims is that 
they are under the thrall of a very well executed Charismatic leadership that the Kims 
have seemingly perfected into a hermit state that has complete control over its 
population by using a variety of techniques ranging from propaganda to tyranny, 
something we will go in depth with over the next few pages.
The Korean propaganda machine churns 24 hours a day non-stop, proclaiming the 
excellence of the Eternal President Kim Il-Sung and his son, current leader Kim Jong Il, 
with a masterful propaganda of folklore and myths about everything from his birth 
(Kim Jong Il: Brief History: 1998) (Born on a sacred mountain as a bright star lit up the 
sky, the seasons spontaneously changed from winter to spring, and rainbows appeared) 
to his exceptional athletic achievements (Reports that he hit 5 hole-in-ones on a single 
round of golf) This, as we have mentioned before, is clearly an example of charismatic 
leadership based on glorification and near divinity of its leader, elevating Kim Il-Sung 
and Kim Jong-Il to magical heights, possession attributes that are not accessible for the 
commoner, perceiving them as “blessed” and supernatural (Weber: 1958). This 
propaganda is time tested and has been used to establish legitimacy from as far back as 
the Maurya Empire over 300 years B.C. (Boesche: 2003) and these many examples of 
Kim Il-Sung's divinity and  Kim Jong-Il's glorious feats in every aspect of human life is 
an example of perhaps the most extreme propaganda state ever sustained by man, with 
complete seclusion from any other media, the Korean population are being coerced into 
believing everything that the media tells them, as Kim Jong-Il himself is shrouded in 
mystery and glory. What impresses most about the regime is the incredible consistency 
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in which the propaganda and coercion is executed with a complete travel embargo and 
absolutely no outside influences. These factors make the Kim rule as close to 
completely eliminating political and social threat as any regime has done continuously 
in history, and especially in the 20th and 21st century where the world has progressively 
“shrunk” in time & space.
Moving on from a past tainted by Japanese oppression, the newly liberated North Korea 
made primary education compulsory in 1950. The free education also included 
textbooks, uniforms and other amenities. By 1956, nationwide primary education was 
achieved, and through the span of the next few decades, the amount of years of 
compulsory education has gradually been heightened, and has since 1975 been fixed at 
ten years of school and one year of preschool education. By the end of the 1980s, “the 
attendance rate in primary and secondary schools during the Cold War was reported to 
have been 96 percent (Savada 1994: 93)” Schwekendiek proposes three obvious reasons 
why the government implemented compulsory education: First, in order to indoctrinate 
the people from their youth. Second, to weaken the bonds between children and their 
biological parents, while strengthening the image of Kim Il-Sung as a fatherly figure 
and third, to improve labour participation rates. An interesting detail about the North 
Korean education system is that its emphasis on primary school education stands out 
with the fewer students per teacher in comparison to nearby countries. This is the age of 
puberty and also the point where children are integrated into labour education. At that 
age, “the regime starts to make children aware of their political glass ceilings”. 
(Schwekendiek, 2011: 70)
With the political formation of the DPRK, educational emphasis was put on “nation-
building and Communism” in the 1940s, “Communist-class” topics in the 1950s, 
“revolutionary tradition” in the 1960s, “Juche” in the 1970s, and the personality cult of 
the leaders in the 1980s. In school, students sing songs of the great deeds of Kim Il-
Sung, and are taught arithmetic by counting how many American soldiers were killed 
and tanks destroyed by the North Korean army. The ideological undertone and political 
dominance is seen all over the educational system. “An elementary school book from 
the early 1980s was reported to contain the following number of citations by topic: first, 
personality cult (744 citations to Kim Il-Sung, 44 citations to the anti-Japanese guerrilla 
fighters); second, socialism (270 citations to fatherland, 53 citations to revolution); and 
third, enemy (139 citations to American imperialism, 85 citations to overall enemies, 52 
citations to Japanese imperialism)” (Yang, in Schwekendiek, 2011: 73)
Theoretically, acceptance into a higher education in North Korea is open to anyone who 
meets the required grades, but in actuality, the access to university is guarded first and 
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foremost by an assessment of the student's political background, then extracurricular 
activities and grades. The higher educational sector of the DPRK has met challenges in 
the fields of marketisation and technocratisation. The post-Cold War economy seems to 
be attempting to 'catch up'. In 2001, 480 of 503 North Korean students sent abroad 
majored in business and economics. Also, the reclusive nature of the regime has 
resulted in a considerable lack of interpreters and linguists.
The DPRK also established two types of extracurricular education: work-education and 
re-education. Although attendance is voluntary at both, the political status of families 
can be affected negatively if their children skip classes. Work-education functions to 
generate a “total experience” through labour. Students of all ages work a number of 
weeks per year, increasing with age, providing helping hands in sectors such as 
irrigation, planting, construction and production, although the North Korean 
constitution states that the minimum working age is 16 years. It is noteworthy to 
mention that the work-education largely reduces the free time of students, thus having a 
great impact on the elimination of uncontrollable extracurricular private studies. Re-
education, on the other hand, affects North Koreans of all ages. 14-15 year-old students 
attend re-education meetings 3-4 times a week (Hunter 1999: 60). All adults have to 
attend self-criticism lessons. It is often required of workers that they engage in political 
study sessions in the morning and evening. (Hunter 1999: 110-111). Officials who have 
been in contact with foreigners are sent to re-education camps in rural areas, and 
workers in factories run by foreigners must undergo special re-education. Lastly, 
soldiers attend re-education sessions once a week. Regarding the contents of the re-
education, attendants must prepare reports and criticise themselves as well as others by 
taking special notice of any wrongdoings since the last session – followed up by a 
group discussion. The result is a system where people are made to spy on each other.
Moreover, the DPRK government ensures that all their citisens receive the same 
ideological update every day through speakers with an antenna attached: an instalment 
which can be found in practically every household and public place. Remarkably low 
rates of radios and television sets in the private sphere fit well with the mere 11 radio 
stations and 3 TV-channels (two of them only broadcast on weekends) (Moeskes 2004: 
17)
What is broadcasted in North Korean media mainly revolve around topics such as 
resistance against Japan in colonial Korea and resistance against the US and South 
Korea during the Korean War. Also, pseudo-documentaries about Kim Jong-Il, Juche 
and the architectural and natural beauty of North Korea seem to be prevalent. 
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(Holloway: 2002)
The DPRK has been broadcasting radio propaganda in Korean, English and Chinese 
beyond its own borders since the 1950s, but inside the North it is highly illegal to listen 
to foreign radio and watch foreign TV, and every radio and television set must be 
registered with the government. Accordingly, the government also ensures that 
frequencies are fixed and regularly controlled, rendering South Korean signals unable to 
reach deeper than 50 kilometres past the demilitarised sone. Taking a closer look at 
North Korean propaganda, it is evident that Kim Il-Sung was behind the prohibition of 
books published before 1945 in order to rewrite official Korean history. The country's 
postal system was not expanded from 1949, and the same goes for the telephone sector 
after 1953. This can be seen as an attempt to minimise private contact and long-distance 
correspondences. Kang and Rigoulot state that North Koreans outbound letters are 
reviewed and will not be posted if they are deemed critical to the regime. This 
methodology is in stark contrast with the constitution's guarantee of "privacy of 
correspondence". In addition to this, only a few public phone booths exist in the DPRK, 
and most phone calls go through operators. Cellular phones are, besides being too 
expensive for common people to use, generally forbidden on the grounds of national 
security concerns, and access to worldwide internet services is unavailable, with the 
DPRK offering an intranet instead. (Schwekendiek, 2011: 75-80)
With the majority of the population having lived the entire lives under a Marxist-
Leninist, Juche inspired rule; in a continuous state of war one could be liable to think 
that the people of North Korea simply are not aware of any other way of living than the 
current turmoil the country is in. With Juche being the only philosophy taught in public 
schools, the massive waves of propaganda transmitted around the clock that the Kims 
are messiah-like figures, and the notion that the imperialist outside world is trying to 
intrude on their lives; combined with limited access to the outside world in general on 
the counts of a state controlled media, and no meaning of accessing the world outside 
via telephone or internet, it seems as though one of the main reasons for a lack of 
Korean revolution, the likes of what we have seen in other communist rules is that there 
simply is no knowledge of a “better” life.
With the previous question in mind as well as the following question, we believe it to be 
of use employing Michael Billigs theory on banal nationalism. Especially seeing as the 
North Korean regime puts a lot of emphasis on loyalty towards the country and the 
party. As we mentioned in our theory chapter, nationalism is a large part of what makes 
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people go to war, and to a larger degree what makes people willing to make the 
“ultimate sacrifice”. The case of war and making the ultimate sacrifice is especially  
interesting in the context of North Korea having been at war for several decades now. 
So it is interesting to see symbols of banal nationalism that are employed in North 
Korea.
That being said, we do realise that because of the structure of the North Korean political 
as well as social stage, that these symbols are used to promote patriotism, but also, 
perhaps even to a larger degree, to promote personal loyalty towards the Kim family 
and their rule. As such the theory is not simply applied to banal symbols that promote 
patriotism in North Korea, but also symbols in all its forms that promote loyalty and 
love for the Kim family. 
As we will touch on in the following segment, the North Korean day-care centres and 
the preschool institutions have pictures and paintings of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il 
(Park 2002: 52) these being something you grow up with from an age before speech, 
will automatically become just another part of the wallpaper, and in that line of thought,  
it fits in with the theory of banal nationalism, it is a symbol that goes unnoticed, but 
according to the theory, none the less has influence.  Preschool institutions however, 
have a lot more of these symbols being used. Another example from Park's book on 
North Korea is that the children of these preschool institutions are subjected to stories 
of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il as children doing brave and heroic deeds. 
Remembering how banal nationalism works, and that the emphasis on symbols that go 
unnoticed, we believe that we can couple this to these preschool stories, plays and 
songs. When it starts this early, there is not really the choice of noticing, they simply 
become part of your world, not being something you notice as a symbol of loyalty or 
patriotism, but something that can influence regardless. These same symbols (plays, 
pictures and songs) continue throughout formal education, and even get complimented 
by referencing works and speeches by these two North Korean characters, alongside 
other patriotic figures (Park 2002: 51-54) 
A key example of banal nationalism in North Korea is currency. Currency is something 
that all countries have, and they all have pictures of one thing or another, usually 
something that depicts a person or an object that is of great national import. In this, 
North Korea does not disappoint. Its highest denomination note is the 5000 won, which 
unsurprisingly has a depiction of Kim Il-Sung, and the symbolism there is not lost in the 
context of banal nationalism. The highest denomination currency is often also the one 
of most symbolic importance, which of course goes hand in hand with the status of Kim 
Il-Sung in North Korea. The note can be seen below:
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3Looking at the significance of Kim Il-Sung in North Korea, and his face on the 5000 
won, it seems only logical that the second highest denomination note would feature 
Kim Jong-Il. Surprisingly, this is not the case, not directly at least. The 2000 won note, 
depicts the legendary hut on Mt. Baekdu, where Kim Jong-Il was allegedly born 
(CollectorsCorner.com: 2011b). So while it does not directly depict Kim Jong-Il, the 
symbolism is certainly present. The rest of the currency is divided as follows: 500, 200 
and 100 won notes are national monuments, and 50, 20 and 10 are respectively workers, 
the military and last the students and teachers (Kook, P. S: 2009). From a point of 
departure in banal nationalism, it seems clear that the notes of North Korea do indeed 
help to produce and reproduce nationhood.
Other symbols are the Kimilsungia orchid Kimjongilia begonia (KCNA.co.jp: 2008), 
which are flowers directly named after the current North Korean leader and his father, 
the eternal president. These flowers are simply a part of the tapestry of everyday life, 
and as such their meaning goes unnoticed. They are symbols that produce and 
reproduce nationhood in everyday life, according to banal nationalism, symbols like 
these, symbols that do not confront people, help produce loyalty and patriotism.   
3 (www.collectorscorner.com: 2011a)
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5.4 Working question 3
Can the population of North Korea be considered politically and socially free?
Key assumption: The people of North Korea are held in complete isolation from the rest 
of the world: deprived of citizenship and social and political rights – in our sense of the 
term.
Karl Marx had his thoughts on censorship published in a supplement for no. 135 of the 
Rheinische Zeitung, a Rhenish newspaper, in 1842. In this supplement to the 
newspaper, Karl Marx deals with the pros and cons of censorship versus freedom of the 
press. The text is structured as a conversation of sorts, with a hypothetical individual 
that has a pro censorship stance, and through this conversation Marx deals with what is 
the greater evil, a complete state-dictated censorship or a free press, which could 
potentially manipulate people.  While Marx takes both sides of the story into account, 
his second segment in the text makes it clear, that he does not support censorship of 
media:
“The censorship law, therefore, is not a law, it is a police measure; but it is a bad police  
measure, for it does not achieve what it intends, and it does not intend what it  
achieves.”(Marx: 1842)
Marx goes on to say that censorship simply does not work due to the fact that 
everything created that opposed this censorship will simply turn into martyrs, be it 
books or flyers. Marx follows up with stating that, for good or bad, the free press is 
“the ubiquitous vigilant eye of a people’s soul, the embodiment of a people’s faith in  
itself” (Marx: 1842) So not only is a censorship not to be desired, it could potentially 
also disrupt the link of the people to their state, or more importantly their ability to 
reflect on themselves. Marx realised that a free press is not without its issues, and that 
there is a “dark” side to everything: “You cannot pluck the rose without its 
thorns!”(Marx: 1842)
As stated earlier, the structure of the text is made as a conversation between Marx and a 
hypothetical critic, and this comes to the fore when the “critic” interrupts Marx, saying 
that if the press was actually free, then it would create “an inner demoralisation” and 
that this inner demoralisation would undermine our faith in man’s higher purpose. 
(Marx: 1842) Marx however replies with a segment of text, which we perceive to be 
especially relevant in the context of North Korea:
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“It is the censored press that has a demoralising effect. Inseparable from it is the most  
powerful vice, hypocrisy, and from this, its basic vice, come all its other defects, which  
lack even the rudiments of virtue, and its vice of passivity, loathsome even from the  
aesthetic point of view. The government hears only its own voice, it knows that it hears  
only its own voice, yet it harbours the illusion that it hears the voice of the people, and  
it demands that the people, too, should itself harbour this illusion. For its part,  
therefore, the people sinks partly into political superstition, partly into political  
disbelief, or, completely turning away from political life, becomes a rabble of private  
individuals.”(Marx: 1842)
It is obvious to us that Marx’s is irrefutable against censorship of the press, and he is an 
opponent of this for a myriad of reasons, as we can plainly see in the previous quote. 
Not only could censorship compromise the link between a people and its state, and in 
extension the world, but it could also compromise the people’s ability to self-reflect. All 
in all, censorship only serves to distance a people from its state, and generally 
demoralises the population. Marx even seems to suggest in the previous quote that all 
the state is doing is confounding itself with illusions that the people do not share, and as 
such makes them remove themselves from the political life. The following quote is 
more to the point concerning censorships role on the rights of a people:  
“But our speaker is afraid of freedom of the press owing to his concern for "private  
persons". He overlooks that censorship is a permanent attack on the rights of private  
persons, and still more on ideas.”(Marx: 1842)
The conversation continues, and the “critic” starts to fear for how the press could affect 
private persons. However, as Marx states, by doing that, he quite simply overlooks the 
fact that censorship in general, attacks the rights of all private persons and as Marx 
suggests even more importantly, it attacks ideas. We can gather from this that Marx, not 
being opposed to the freedom of the press, also would not be opposed to the concept of 
freedom of speech.
Now that we have the opinion of one side of the political compass, we would like to 
include thoughts from the opposite part. Marx and Marxism being far left on said 
compass, we would like to see how liberalists, the opposite of Marxists view censorship 
and the free media. In order to do this, we have decided to include a piece of John 
Locke, a 17th century political theorist of English origins. Locke wrote a piece called 
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Two Treaties of Government, and in this piece, he describes the State of Nature, a State 
of Perfect Freedom, wherein the Laws of Nature exist, and these laws transcend our 
own. He believes that men are born into this State of Perfect Freedom, this State of 
Equality where no man may threaten the Natural Laws of another (Locke 1988: 269).
“The state of nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: And  
Reason which is that law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all  
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or  
Possessions”(Locke 1988: 271)
Based on his Treaties, we believe that Locke found mankind to come from a place of 
perfect freedom where all men are equal, and only subject to a Master Workman, or 
God (Locke 1988: 271). He believed that the only way for a person to be ruled over by 
another would be through consent (Locke 1988: 332). While Locke does not outright 
bring up the freedom of the press or the freedom of speech, we would argue that they 
are part of Locke’s ideas on a person’s liberties. We believe this as he states that men 
have the right to do everything within the Laws of Nature, meaning that as long as a 
person does not threaten the life, health, liberty or possessions of others, he can more or 
less do or say what he wants. 
Of course Locke is hardly the only liberalist, so if we move to the more recent John 
Rawls, we will see in his Theory of Justice (McLean & McMillan: 2009: 451-52), 
political liberty is one of the first points included. On a less theoretical note, one could 
look at any number of western liberal countries or supranational organisations and tie 
their respective constitutions or declarations into this argument.4
Moving on from the different political perspectives on the free press and the rights of 
people, we will try to determine what the situation is in North Korea. Modern media is 
full of reports on the conditions of North Korea, and there are stories of radio 
broadcastings from North Korean defectors several places, along with more general 
stories on the conditions and defectors.(Kane, K: 2007)(Trembath, B: 2011)
(NKRadio.org: 2011) However we needed something more consistent than random 
articles. To do this we are going to use information, analysis, models and other from 
Freedom House, an international freedom organisation with its headquarters in the 
United States of America. Freedom House has several publications per year; many of 
4  The first Amendment of the United States of America is the freedom of speech. 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also the freedom of 
speech/expression(un.org: 1948)
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those directly pertain to our question. The first of these publications is Freedom in the 
World, and the second Freedom of the Press. After reading through the first publication, 
we found out that North Korea actually had a larger presence in one of Freedom 
House’s lesser publications, called The Worst of the Worst (Piano, A. et al. 2011: 18), as 
well as in their individual country reports online (FreedomHouse.org: 2011c) So how 
free is the press of North Korea really, according to Freedom House?  On their online 
page, in their 2011 version of their individual press country reports, North Korea has 
received the rating of 97 (FreedomHouse.org, 2011a). To answer what that actually 
means, we will give a brief description of the methodology employed by Freedom 
House.
The way it works is that Freedom House rates a given country’s freedom of press, by 
posing 23 methodological questions divided into three sub categories (legal 
environment, political environment and economic environment), each question will 
then be numerically rated. These ratings will then indicate if a given country is “free” 
(0-30 points) “partly free” (31-60 points) or “not free” (61-100 points). A relevant 
example of a question could be “Do people have access to media coverage and a range 
of news and information that is robust and reflects a diversity of 
viewpoints?”(FreedomHouse.org, 2011b) This is from their political environment sub-
category.
Returning once more to the rating of 97 points out of 100, we can clearly see that 
according to Freedom House and its data, North Korea is one of the world’s least free 
places in the context of the press. An illustration of their map of press freedom from 
2006 is shown below:
Green means free, yellow means partly free and purple means not free5
5  An excerpt from Freedom House’s Map of Press Freedom 2006 (Freedom House: 2006)
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The situation in North Korea is actually so bad that Freedom House describes it as 
follows:
“North Korea remained the most repressive media environment in the world in 2010.  
The one-party regime owns all media, attempts to regulate all communication, and  
rigorously limits the ability of North Koreans to access information.”  
(FreedomHouse.org: 2011a)
According to their research, foreign reporters are not allowed to keep their cell phones, 
and are handled to make sure that they never have too much contact with the actual 
populace (FreedomHouse.org, 2011a). Keeping in mind that the original question we 
posed, as to whether or not the populace of a country could be called free when 
information is censored and free speech non-existent, we will now look at some of the 
rights of the population. The most obvious of these is of course the freedom of speech, 
and as such, we have taken a look into the 19986 version of North Korea’s constitution 
(Novexcn.com: 1998). Thinking back on the statements of Freedom House, one would 
assume that North Koreans have no constitutional rights concerning the freedom of 
speech. That assumption however, has proved incorrect: 
“Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, demonstration 
and association.” (Novexcn.com, 1998: Article 67)
So North Koreans actually do enjoy the constitutional rights of free speech, at least on 
paper. Knowing that what the constitution states and what actually happens are not 
necessarily the same, we decided to look into the reality of North Korean rights. Using 
Freedom House’s “Worst of the Worst” publication of 2010, we will attempt to paint a 
picture of the political and social rights of North Korea. “Worst of the Worst” is not 
unlike the “Freedom of Press” publication in its approach to giving a country a 
numerical value to indicate its status. It works by asking certain questions with 
numerical values attached to the answer, these questions are part of one of two sub-
categories and the end result of both of these two sub-categories are then divided and 
used to indicate a final score between 1 and 7. An example of one of the political rights 
questions (the seconds category is civil rights) is as follows: “Is the head of government 
or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?” Based on all of 
the above, we are not very surprised to find out that North Korea is in the bottom. As far 
6  A few changes were made in a later version, but no changes concerning the articles we employ. The 
reason for not sourcing the later version is a matter of availability.
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as this publication goes, North Korea is actually the world’s worst country when it 
comes to the rights of its citizenry:
“Only one country, North Korea, has been at the bottom of the ratings scale every year  
since the Freedom in the World survey began nearly 40 years ago” (Piano, A. et al. 
2011: 2)
North Korea, though being a democratic republic in name, does not seem to fulfil this 
title. Kim Jong-Il has led the country since the death of his father, the “Eternal Presid-
ent” Kim Il-Sung, and anyone who runs for office does this without competition due to 
being chosen by the Korean Worker’s Party. The Supreme People’s Assembly is accord-
ing to Freedom House, simply a “rubber-stamp institution” with a few irregular meet-
ings every year. The Supreme People’s Assembly however, is not the only institution 
that does not work as one would typically imagine. In September of 2010 they held 
their first delegates meeting since 1966. The meeting consisted of several member of 
the Kim family getting promoted, along with Kim Jong-Un who was elected to the of-
fice of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Generally, Freedom House 
believes corruption to be present at every level of the North Korean political and eco-
nomic system (Piano, A. et al. 2011: 18). As we mentioned above, despite the constitu-
tion, North Koreans seem to enjoy no free speech or freedom of the press. In the “Worst 
of the Worst”, Freedom House exemplifies this with the fact that all television and ra-
dio-sets are singularly tuned into government channels and programs. It is actually il-
legal to watch foreign television, and can be led to being arrested (FreedomHouse.org, 
2011a) Aside from not upholding their own constitution, forced labour, public execu-
tions and torture are among the international human rights that North Korea is breach-
ing (Piano, A. et al. 2011: 18)
Information is an important part of a democratic society, and constitutionally, North 
Korea is exactly that; a democracy. 
“All citisens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be elected,  
irrespective of sex, race, occupation, length of residence, property status, education  
party affiliation, political views or religion.” (Novexcn.com, 1998: Article 66)
However, we do not believe the simple right to elect or be elected is enough to describe 
a democratic society. As such, we figure that we need to look at the flow, substance and 
availability of information in North Korea. While we have already determined that the 
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North Korean media is completely state controlled, and thus heavily censored, we have 
not looked at the academic institutions and its milieu, a place designed to impart know-
ledge of the world onto its subjects. As with most other countries in our world, North 
Korea’s school system is structured in different levels. The first is preschool education, 
the second primary school and the third colleges and universities (Park 2002: 51-54). So 
what exactly is the academic situation of these different academic layers? The preschool 
part education mainly consists of care centres, where the children of the workers can be 
taken care of during work hours. According to Park in his book “North Korea – The 
Politics of Unconventional Wisdom”, the activities of these centres are heavily influ-
ence by political socialisation. What Park describes in his chapter on North Korean edu-
cation, makes one think of indoctrination as opposed to actual education. A typical cen-
ter will, according to Park, feature large pictures of the Great Leader and the Dear Lead-
er7, aside from that, the curriculum of these centres will typically involve heroic tales of 
these two figures, when they were just children. Songs and plays are also taught to the 
children of the centres, all of them intended to provoke patriotism and loyalty to the 
North Korean regime. Concerning indoctrination, a quote from Park seems appropriate:
“As the children are fed, they will be told that they are fortunate to be given food when  
children in South Korea and all over the world are starving” (Park 2002: 52)
So according to this information, the young do not grow into North Korean politics of 
their own volition; they grow up as part of it from a very young age. If this is the case 
of the preschools, then how does the primary school function? The primary school in 
North Korea has a full 11 years of compulsory primary school, which Park describes as 
being more than most third world countries, or even South Korea. A better comparison 
for our project however, might be Denmark itself, where we only have 9 years of com-
pulsory primary school. School uniforms are given during an opening ceremony along 
with the materials that are needed. In Park’s words: “… “handed down” by the leader-
ship that “passionately loves and cares for each child.”” The textbooks are filled with 
pictures, stories and events that involve Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, much like the 
case in preschool it would seem. Also mentioned is the condemnation of western re-
gimes, puppet regimes and general critique aimed specifically at South Korea and The 
United States of America. After the daily class, the children are required to spend at 
7  Respectively Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il.
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least 3 hours of extra activities, as they are all required to master at least 3 different 
skills8 (Park 2002: 52).  
It seems that aside from the level of education, the primary school still has a lot of em-
phasis on being pro Kim Jong-Il and generally against the western world. The last insti-
tutions we need to cover are the higher educations, which North Korea has three distinct 
forms of. The first is Comprehensive Universities, where there, according to Park, 
seems to only be one; The Kim Il-Sung University (Park 2002: 53). This comprehensive 
university is also the place where a majority of North Korean political figures took their 
education. The institution consists of 15 different disciplines, the most sought after of 
those being The Department of the Works of Kim Il-Sung (Park 2002: 53). The second 
of these higher educations are the technical and vocational institutions, which while not 
directly political or philosophical in nature, unlike the comprehensive university, still  
have time allocated for the study of Juche, as well as political discussion and self-criti-
cism (Park 2002: 54). 
The last form of higher education is the college factories that are, indicative of its name, 
a mixture between work and education. It is an education where you live on site, i.e. the 
place where you both work and study. Aside from performing one type of work or an-
other, the students also receive college-level education from visiting teacher of the 
aforementioned institutions. Park states that “ideological education designed to incul-
cate Juche ideas is central” (Park 2002: 54). As with the plays, songs and teachings of 
both pre and primary school, the higher education’s are also heavily influenced by an-
ti-imperialism and research material often involve books, speeches and videos of Kim 
Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il and other famous North Korean patriots (Park 2002: 54). Accord-
ing to Park, the government maintains that every one of an age to attend a higher educa-
tion is in fact enrolled. Something to consider however, is that there are only 12.000 
students enrolled in the Kim Il-Sung University, as opposed to nearly 37.000 enrolled at 
the University of Copenhagen (KU.dk :2011) which, while being the Danish university 
with the most students, it is still only one of several large universities in Denmark. For 
the sake of perspective, it should also be noted that North Korea has a population of 
more than 22, 5 million, whereas Denmark has a population below 6 million. We realise 
the discrepancy of Park’s 2002 numbers versus the Danish 2011 numbers, but still be-
lieve them to be highly indicative.
8  Described as being primarily athletic in nature. but also music, art and drama.
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So we can conclude that North Korea, and its rule, though allegedly being Marxist-Len-
inist inspired, does not follow step with Marx not supporting censorship, as everything 
in North Korea is censored by the state. North Korea’s rule matches even less with 
Locke and liberalist thinking as we can see with censorship and the severe breach of 
several human rights. It would seem that with breaches in even the most elementary of 
human rights, there are strong indications that the population is in no way free. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1 Discussion
Our project has been build up using a problem formulation, which is the overall 
problem we wish to shed light on. In this case our problem formulation is: How has the 
ideology of 'Juche', and the Kim family created and maintained their rule of North  
Korea? Seeing as we are doing a deductive approach, we do not just have a problem 
formulation, but also a hypothesis. Our hypothesis is our guess as to how the outcome 
of the project will look, meaning the answer for the problem in a sense. Our hypothesis 
is: We hypothesise that the Kim family rules a country through excessive propaganda,  
an extensive military and cult-like personal worship.
 In order to shed light on the problem, as well as prove or disprove our hypothesis, we 
needed some working questions, and in our case these were accompanied by some key 
assumptions. Our first question was: What are the main characteristics and differences  
between the various forms of communist inspired ideology, and how does Juche  
compare? To this question, our assumption was: Juche’s particular status as a state  
philosophy has succeeded in keeping one family in power for almost 60 years. It has  
made the North Korean regime into an autocracy. This structure of having a working 
question and a following assumption is found in our second and third working 
questions, as can be seen: From a Weberian point of view on legitimate rule, and  
through Billig’s theory of banal nationalism, what measures are taken by the regime to  
ensure loyalty and patriotism from the people of North Korea? With the assumption: 
The fact that North Korea has been a warring nation for more than 60 years has helped  
the dynasty to stay in power. The last question and assumption is as follows: Can the 
population of North Korea be considered politically and socially free? With 
assumption: The people of North Korea are held in complete isolation from the rest of  
the world, deprived of social, political and human rights, but also knowledge in  
general.
Having answered these questions and assumptions to the best of our ability9, we find 
ourselves in the situation of having to discuss our results, and from this bring forth the 
concentrated results into a conclusion. For the part of the discussion, we will bring forth 
our part-conclusions from our analysis. 
9  For more detail, see our delimitation section as well as our afterthoughts.
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Through our historical contextualisation, we knew that Kim Il-Sung was the creator of 
Juche, and that he had, according to himself, based it on Marxism and Leninism. While 
some parts of the Juche philosophy did to some degree compare, the practice of it has 
served to keep the Kim family in power. In comparison to other autocracies, Juche has 
served exceptionally well in keeping one family in power for two generations and well 
over 60 years, and with the third member of the Kim family allegedly being groomed 
for the position as head of North Korea. Based on this, it would indicate that our first 
assumption is indeed correct, even though we realise that the philosophy of Juche has 
not been the only factor in the power of the Kims. 
The second question and assumption dealt with a Weberian view on legitimacy and 
Billig’s theory of banal nationalism in a North Korean context. Through our analysis, 
we realised that there were several factors in play. First of all, the vast majority of North 
Korea has solely lived under Juche and Kim rule, but during this rule, the majority have 
also lived in a continuous state of war, something that they are confronted with often, 
through either books, newspapers or television (not the radio though, as it has been 
banned due to the state not being able to monopolise radio waves). One could conclude 
that most North Koreans simply do not realise that there is any other way of living, than 
what currently exists. This is primarily due to the “hermit” state of the country. The 
North Korean state has effectively isolated the people, and as such are the only outlet 
for information and news. Through our project, it became apparent that the one of the 
reasons for the success of the regime was due to the ‘charismatic legitimacy’ of the Kim 
family. The propaganda is aired constantly, presenting the Kims in an almost divine 
light, as infallible, just and caring rulers of the North Korean people. This propaganda is 
aimed at all ages of the population.
 We employed the theory of banal nationalism in order to determine if there was usage 
of unnoticed banal symbols that are creating a feeling of nationhood, patriotism and 
loyalty. While every country in the world uses banal nationalism to some extent10, North 
Korea uses these symbols for the purpose of creating a feeling of nationhood and 
patriotism, but these symbols are usually reserved for the unnoticed promotion of 
nationhood, and not the promotion of personal or regime loyalty. We believe it is telling 
that the largest North Korean currency features the creator of Juche, and the first leader 
of North Korea, Kim Il-Sung. While it could be argued that he is a historical person, 
who is a great symbol of North Korean nationhood, the same can hardly be said for his 
son, Kim Jong-Il, who while not being featured directly on the second highest 
10  Flags, anthems, holidays, currency.
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denomination note, is certainly represented in the depiction of the mythical place of his 
birth, the log cabin on Mt. Baektu. In conclusion we believe that the reason that a North 
Korean revolution has never been on the rise is due to the fact that most Koreans simply 
do not know why to rebel, as they have no picture of an existence better than their own. 
Unlike other communist rules of our history, they have no knowledge of what goes on 
outside their own borders. We also believe that the state of war in North Korea has 
helped keep the population more docile than normally. 
In our third and last working question and assumption pertaining to the political and so-
cial freedom of the North Korean population, we believe that there is a great constitu-
tional paradox, in the sense that the people are constitutionally afforded the right to 
vote, free speech and assembly just to name a few. There is also freedom of religion and 
press. Of all these abovementioned rights, we see none of them fulfilled in the daily 
lives of North Koreans. Throughout the entire public school system, from preschool to 
the university, the people of North Korea are indoctrinated to believe that the Kim rule 
is a just rule, and that they are a happy people living under the benevolence of their dear 
leader Kim Jong-Il, who deeply cares for them. Kim Jong-Il and his father, Kim Il-Sung 
are featured in preschool stories, where they are presented as brave, courageous and in-
fallible, despite only being children in these nursery tales. There are pictures in every 
room in every preschool, primary school or university. Being confronted with this on a 
daily basis, while also having no access to uncensored information, means that the 
people have no information with which to compare what the state tells them, this along 
with heavy use of propaganda and indoctrination indicates that the population of North 
Korea have almost no political or social rights in practice. In many cases, there even 
seem to be breaches in basic human rights. Our analysis seems to confirm our assump-
tion and answer our third working question.
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6.2 Conclusion
Throughout the project, we have established that the DPRK functions as an autocracy 
with Kim Jong-Il at the center of power. Unlike other ex-communist states, the North 
Korean history never culminated in a revolution. We have discovered that the reason for 
this is intricately connected with the Juche ideology, which has gradually been imple-
mented in the aftermath of DPRK's independence. The majority of the population have 
lived their entire lives under the Juche-based rule. This means that the people have been 
exposed to massive waves of propaganda proclaiming both an almost divine status of 
the Kims but also an apparently continuous state of war that the country is in due to the 
"imperialist outside". This, combined with a lack of communication with the outside 
world (both in terms of state-controlled media and internet censorship), has resulted in a 
North Korean people which is simply unaware of a "better" life.
The theories we have used in the project have seemed ideal to describe the way the 
Juche ideology has affected the political legitimacy of the Kims and the lack of demo-
cracy in the DPRK. Weber's idea of charismatic leadership corresponds well with the 
deification of the Kims in the sense that every assertion that they make is considered le-
gitimate. Billig's theory of banal nationalism fits well in regard to the recurring symbols 
that lay the foundation for the creation of the nation and the maintenance of loyalty 
among the people towards the state. The country's constitutional rights are by no means 
upheld, human rights are not maintained, and knowledge is withheld at a state level, as 
the educational system is structured to indoctrinate the population. Thus, this is our in-
terpretation of how the Kim-regime continues to sustain its legitimacy among its 
people.
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7. Afterthoughts
Considering our analysis of current North Korean rule and how the Juche idea has 
transformed from Marxist-Leninst to its own ideas, we thought it would be interesting 
to compare Kim Jong-Ils current rule to the Feudalist rule of medieval Europe, a term 
that describes a set of reciprocal legal and military obligations among the warrior nobil-
ity, revolving around the three key concepts of lords,vassals, and fiefs (Ganshoff 1944). 
A lord was in broad terms a noble who held land, a vassal was a person who was gran-
ted possession of the land by the lord, and the land was known as a fief. In exchange for 
the use of the fief and the protection of the lord, the vassal would provide some sort of 
service to the lord. Fiefdom, or land-owning became the base principle for feudalism, 
with lords sitting on all the power, and the vassals attempt to provide services and di-
videns to set lord in order to get some of his fief.
The classical sense of the term has since been expanded to include political situations in 
which the state controls large portions of the land and resources in the country and 
distributes these resources with little to no legal incentive or pressure on them to 
distribute in a particular way other than what they see fit. A tyrannical rule, one may 
suggest.
Kim Jong-Il has made North Korea his fief, and him the only lord by continuously 
keeping the country in a state of fear and lockdown, as noted by Bennett Ramberg of 
the US. State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs who said: 
”For Kim Jong-Il, nuclear weapons provide a means to preserve his fiefdom. 
They generate international tension that justifies the garrison state. They 
compensate for conventional military weaknesses, providing a hedge against 
perceived U.S. military designs. They furnish leverage to extract international 
humanitarian assistance and economic investment from a nervous South Korea. 
And they provide an economically failing regime a marquee to demonstrate 
strength, resolve and modernity.” (Ramberg 2006)
Ramberg notes many of the same things as we have during this report, that Kim Jong-Il 
and the rule of North Korea is based on the constant threat of war, and that Kim Jong-Il 
remains the supreme feudal lord of North Korea’s resources, only out of necessity due 
to the constant fear of war from imperialist enemies, a state of tension that he helps 
create by constantly threatening South Korea and the U.N. with nuclear capabilities and 
55
attacks on performa targets that serve no military purpose other than to maintain a 
“cold-war-esque” stalemate between North Korea and the rest of the world. If Kim 
Jong-Il were to give up his military assets and massive propaganda in his own country, 
he would lose his lordship immediately as there is no need for a feudal system of lords, 
vassals and fiefs if there is no reason for the Lord to maintain control over the land.
Kim Jong-Il and to an extend his father Kim Il-Sung have created a direct parallel to a 
1000-year-old system of nobility and divine gifts and created themselves in a manner 
befitting nobility and royalty in the early part of the second millennium A.D. with their 
seemingly god-like status and their status as the only ones with the competences to take 
any sort of decision regarding the country’s future, the Kims have made themselves 
King and Prince, something perhaps Machiavelli would applaud them for.
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